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We consider “must-sell” auctions with asymmetric buyers. First,
we study auctions with two asymmetric buyers, where the distribution
of valuations of the strong buyer is “stretched” relative to that of the
weak buyer. Then, it is known that ineﬃcient ﬁrst-price auctions are
more proﬁt a b l ef o rt h es e l l e rt h a neﬃcient second-price auctions. This
is because the former favor the weak buyer. However, we show that
the seller can do one better by augmenting the ﬁrst-price auction by
a pre-auction oﬀer made exclusively to the strong buyer. Should the
strong buyer reject the oﬀer, the object is simply sold in an ordinary
ﬁrst-price auction. The result is driven by the fact that the unmodiﬁed
ﬁrst-price auction is too favorable to the weak buyer, and that the
pre-auction oﬀer allows some correction of this to the beneﬁto ft h e
seller. Secondly, we show quite generally that pre-auction oﬀers never
increase the proﬁtability of second-price auctions, since they introduce
the wrong kind of favoritism from the perspective of seller proﬁts.
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11 Introduction
A seller of a unique item is often confronted by two “problems”. On the one
hand, he must sell, and, on the other, he faces heterogenous potential buyers
with unknown valuations of the item. In such a setting, simply posting a
price may well be counterproductive as well as non-credible, since buyers
will conclude that if no one takes the posted price, some kind of negotiation
or auction-like mechanism will subsequently be used by the seller to allocate
the item. Also, since the seller is unable to commit not to sell the item, the
revenue maximizing mechanism, in which trading occurs with a probability
strictly less than one, is precluded. Hence, whatever mechanism the seller
tries to set up, it must ultimately involve trading with probability one. Such
mechanisms are the object of study in the present paper.
In the symmetric independent private-values setting, it is well-know that
any of the eﬃcient, standard must-sell auction formats are, in fact, revenue
maximizing in the class of all must-sell mechanisms (see Bulow & Klem-
perer (1996) and Kirkegaard (2006)). Hence, in order to raise (expected)
revenue, some ineﬃciency must be induced through probabilistic withhold-
ing of the item.1 Thus, if withholding is ruled out, the seller cannot improve
upon the standard auction formats, when buyer valuations are unknown but
drawn from the same distribution. In contrast, if the symmetry assumption is
dropped, it is also well-known that the standard must-sell auction formats are
no longer revenue equivalent (see Maskin & Riley (2000)). In fact, under cer-
tain conditions,2 an ineﬃcient ﬁrst-price auction may revenue-dominate an
eﬃcient second-price format, when potential buyers are asymmetric. Since
both standard auction formats are must-sell formats, the ineﬃciency in the
ﬁr s t - p r i c ef o r m a ti snot related to withholding, but to mis-allocation, in the
sense that the item may not be sold to the highest-valuation bidder. Hence,
this type of ineﬃciency may work to the advantage of the seller, and this
paper investigates how the seller may try to exploit this further, when po-
tential buyers are identiﬁably heterogenous ex ante. Thus, we assume that
t h es e l l e ri sa b l et oi d e n t i f yd i ﬀerent types of bidders, though not the actual
valuation of any particular (type of) bidder.
L e tu sg i v eaf e wo fe x a m p l e so fw h a tw eh a v ei nm i n d . F i r s t ,w h e na
(local) government auctions oﬀ the rights to collect garbage or provide bus
1In the symmetric setting, any standard format augmented by a suitably chosen reserve
price implements the optimal transfers and trading from the perspective of seller revenue.
2F o rm o r eo nt h i s ,s e eb e l o w .
2transportation in a certain area, it is often possible to identify whether par-
ticular bidders already provide similar services elsewhere or whether they are
“greenﬁeld” entrants. Also, bidders know that the contract must (ultimately)
be oﬀered to someone with probability one. Similarly, in a liquidation sale
of an estate including artwork, silverware and antique furniture, the seller
may be able to identify professional and private buyers. Again, all potential
buyers may know that the estate must be liquidated. Finally, in a takeover
c o n t e s t ,o nt h ef a c eo fi tt h e r em a yb ea no b v i o u sa c q u i r e r( e . g . ,aﬁrm in a
similar (or, complementary) line of business with which the management or
the board of the target ﬁrm has close ties). That is, there may be a strong
potential buyer. However, there may also be a set of alternative potential
acquirers, that is, weak potential buyers in our terminology. In addition,
once a takeover contest has been initiated, all potential buyers may surmise
that an eventual takeover is a sure thing.
In the proposed model-setting, the seller can approach a particular po-
tential buyer and make him a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. However, if the oﬀer
is turned down, it is understood by all the parties that the item will sub-
sequently be sold with probability one in some mechanism. Hence, we es-
sentially introduce the possibility of making pre-auctions oﬀers to particular
buyers before some type of must-sell auction is staged among the asymmetric
bidders. Of course, if the pre-auction oﬀer is accepted, the trading mecha-
nism never progresses to the auction stage.3 We study the revenue eﬀects
of such pre-auction oﬀers when the auction stage is comprised of either a
ﬁrst-price auction or a second-price auction.
In the ﬁrst-price auction, we identify two conﬂicting forces which inﬂuence
the proﬁtability of a pre-auction oﬀer to the strong buyer. On the one hand,
the pre-auction oﬀer implies that the strong buyer is more likely to win if
his valuation is high, and this tends to increase revenue. On the other hand,
if the strong buyer rejects the oﬀer, thereby revealing his valuation is not
too high, the outcome in the auction changes because the weak buyer bids
less aggressively than without the pre-auction oﬀe r . T h i si m p l i e st h a ta
strong buyer with an intermediate valuation is also more likely to win more
often, which will tend to reduce revenue. The ﬁr s tp a r to fS e c t i o n2b e l o wi s
devoted to explaining this trade-oﬀ. Incidentally, we notice that introducing
ap r e - a u c t i o no ﬀer may improve eﬃciency in the ﬁrst-price auction.
However, since the analysis of asymmetric ﬁrst-price auctions is notori-
3Pre-auction oﬀers and their acceptance are legally binding, and there is no default.
3ously diﬃcult,4 we use a simple, two-bidder example to capture the eﬀects at
play when allowing a pre-auction oﬀer. Speciﬁcally, both buyers have a valua-
tion drawn from a uniform distribution, but the distributions are “stretched”
over diﬀerent supports. In this environment, the weak buyer bids more ag-
gressively than the strong buyer in a ﬁrst-price auction. Hence, the weak
buyer occasionally wins when eﬃciency deems that he should not. Though
the ﬁrst-price auction is ineﬃcient, it can also be shown that it yields higher
(expected) revenue than a second-price auction. While the trade-oﬀ from in-
troducing a pre-auction oﬀer is general, the use of a speciﬁc example allows
us to prove that the positive factor may outweigh the negative, implying that
a suitably chosen pre-auction oﬀer to the strong buyer improves revenue in
the ﬁrst-price setting.5 Heuristically, this result is driven by the fact that
the ﬁrst-price auction is too favorable to the weak buyer, and that the intro-
duction of a pre-auction oﬀer to the strong bidder allows some correction of
this to the beneﬁt of the seller. In contrast, we show quite generally6 that
pre-auction oﬀe r sc a nn e v e ri n c r e a s et h ep r o ﬁtability of eﬃcient second-price
auctions, since they introduce the wrong kind of favoritism and, thus, the
wrong kind of ineﬃciency from the perspective of seller proﬁts.
The existing literature on pre-auction oﬀers in auction-like mechanisms
is scant. Bulow & Klemperer (1996, p. 189) remark that pre-auction oﬀers
are not proﬁtable in the symmetric case, when a rejection of the oﬀer is
followed by a must-sell auction.7 This is, of course, immediately relevant for
the takeover contest alluded to above, when potential buyers are symmetric
ex ante.8 T h el i t e r a t u r eo nbuy-outs in auctions is also of some relevance
4In particular, the ﬁrst-order conditions of bidder optimization generally give rise to
as y s t e mo fd i ﬀerential equations which eludes explicit solution, save in special cases (see
Plum (1992), Lebrun (1999), Maskin & Riley (2000) and Krishna (2002, Ch. 4)).
5While a similar trade-oﬀ would be at work, were we to give a pre-auction oﬀer to
the weak buyer, we shall argue that this makes little sense with the type of asymmetry
assumed here.
6That is, for an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders and without making particular
distributional assumptions.
7However, Ivanova-Stenzel & Kröger (2005) suggest that pre-auction oﬀers may raise
proﬁt si nt h es y m m e t r i cc a s ew h e nb i d d e r sa r er i s ka v e r s e .
8Bulow & Klemperer explicitly relate their results to U.S. takeover law. There, com-
pany boards are required to show due diligence with respect to the maximization of share-
holder value before entering into exclusive negotiation with a single potential buyer. Their
main result is that eﬀort is better spent looking for more buyers, to increase competition,
rather than negotiating exclusively with one buyer. See Kirkegaard (2006) for an alterna-
tive and short proof of this result. Though related, our focus is diﬀerent, in that we assume
4for this paper.9 Particularly in online auctions, sellers often stipulate a buy-
out price, which will end the auction immediately, if some bidder accepts it.
This has been motivated by risk aversion or impatience on the part of either
sellers or buyers and by the increasing price paths in sequential auctions
associated with multi-unit demands. On the surface, buy-out oﬀers appear
similar to pre-auction oﬀers. However, buy-out oﬀers are general and made to
all potential buyers, whereas the pre-auction oﬀers considered here are made
exclusively to a particular potential buyer based on ex ante information on
his type. The latter only makes sense, if the potential buyers are identiﬁably
heterogenous, whereas the literature on buy-outs has (so far) assumed that
buyers are homogenous ex ante.
At a more general level, this paper is related to the work of Bulow &
Roberts (1989) and Bulow & Klemperer (1996), who developed the basic
relationship between monopoly pricing and (optimal) auctions. In order to
maximize proﬁts, the monopolist will generally try to sell to buyers with the
highest marginal revenues and only to those buyers whose marginal revenues
exceed marginal cost. If marginal cost is taken to be the value for the seller
of retaining an item for himself, then this immediately ties together optimal
auction-reserves and discrimination between heterogenous bidders with third-
degree price discrimination by a monopolist. Our results similarly trade on
how adaptations of standard auction formats allow the seller to “manipulate”
the marginal revenue of the marginal bidder to his own advantage.
Moreover, our work is closely related to the small number of papers that
study ﬁrst-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, notably Lebrun (1999),
and Maskin & Riley (2000) (see also Kirkegaard (2005) and Krishna (2002,
Ch. 4)). The example and the results derived on pre-auction oﬀers in ﬁrst-
price auctions in this paper explicitly take as their point of departure the
revenue rankings found by Maskin & Riley (2000).
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 ﬁrst provides some
fundamental intuitions on our key results.10 Then, we turn our attention
to (two-bidder) ﬁrst-price auctions augmented by a pre-auction oﬀer to the
strong buyer. This shows how a suitably chosen pre-auction oﬀer allows
ex ante asymmetries between potential buyers, while exclusive pre-auction oﬀers are made
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and always followed by a standard auction if rejected.
9See Budish & Takeyama (2001), Reynolds & Wooders (2003), Mathews (2003, 2004),
Hidvégi, Wang & Whinston (2003) and Kirkegaard & Overgaard (2004).
10This is accomplished by drawing on the analogy between auctions and monopoly-
pricing, as suggested by Bulow & Roberts (1989) and Bulow & Klemperer (1996).
5ap r o ﬁtable correction of the outcome of the ﬁrst-price mechanism.11 Fi-
nally, we turn to second-price auctions and show, quite generally, that any
pre-auction oﬀer (irrespective of the oﬀeree) will be self-defeating from the
perspective of the seller.12 Section 3 oﬀers a few concluding remarks. Since
little insight is gained from the details of the formal analysis, this has largely
been relegated to the Appendix.
2G o o d E ﬃciency, Bad Eﬃciency?
First, a thought experiment. Consider a monopolist with zero marginal costs,
who is discriminating between two markets. In market i, willingness-to-pay
ranges from 0 to i, i =1 ,2. Then, it is well understood that, under weak
conditions, it is optimal to favor market 1, the “weak” market, with a lower
price. This is exempliﬁed in Fig. 1, where (inverse) demand curves are











Fig.1. A weak and a strong market (“stretching”)
11That is, by awarding the item more often to the buyer with the high marginal revenue.
12Since the item tends to be awarded more often to buyers with low marginal revenues.
13Unless capacity is large and must be sold, a monopolist with zero marginal costs,
would set prices 0.5 in the weak market and 1 in the strong market. These prices equate
marginal revenue across markets and with marginal cost, and the monopolist would sell
0.5 units in each market.
6Indeed, this conclusion continues to hold, even if the ﬁrm is somewhat
capacity constrained. The existing capacity is spread across the two markets
to equalize marginal revenue, implying that the price in the weak market
must be lower. However, if the ﬁrm faces a stronger capacity constraint,
it is clear that the weak market is not served at all, and that the entire
capacity must be sold on the stronger market. In this case, and only in this
case, will the allocation of goods be eﬃcient. It must be pointed out that
the assumption of a diﬀerent least upper bound on the willingness-to-pay
(vertical intercept) in the two markets is crucial for the latter result.
To summarize, the ﬁrm in question will decide to sell only on the strong
market if capacity is very constrained, but will otherwise serve both markets,
favoring the weak market.
Now, keeping this in mind, we turn to an auctioneer selling an indivisible
good to one of two asymmetric buyers. The seller puts zero value on consum-
ing the good himself, whereas buyers have privately known valuations. For
the weak buyer, this is somewhere between 0 and 1, while the valuation of
the strong buyer is between 0 and 2. Importantly, Bulow and Roberts (1989)
have shown that the problem facing the auctioneer is essentially identical to
the problem facing the monopolist we started out considering, with a possible
capacity constraint.
If the auctioneer uses a second-price auction, the good is won by whoever
values it the most. That is, the auction is eﬃcient. In a ﬁrst-price auction,
however, the weak buyer will bid more aggressively than the stronger buyer,
because, from his point of view, competition is stronger, see Lebrun (1999),
Maskin and Riley (2000) or Krishna (2004, Ch. 4).
Fig. 2 illustrates the equilibrium bidding strategies in the ﬁrst-price auc-
tion when valuations are drawn from uniform distributions corresponding to
the demands in Fig. 1 (for details on the equilibrium bidding, see the Appen-
dix).14 In Fig. 2, the weak buyer’s bidding function, bw(v),i sheavy,w h i l e
that of the strong buyer, bs(v),i sthin. I ti se v i d e n tt h a tt h ew e a kb i d d e r
does, indeed, bid more aggressively. Consequently, the weak buyer will win
the auction more often than is eﬃcient. Thus, while the eﬃcient second-price
auction can be compared to uniform pricing, the ineﬃcient ﬁrst-price auction
is similar to price discrimination in favor of a weak market. This provides
some intuition behind the result that the ﬁrst-price auction is more proﬁtable
14This is one of the only cases in which equilibrium strategies, and equilibrium revenue,
c a nb ec a l c u l a t e de x p l i c i t l yf o rﬁrst-price auctions. See Plum (1992) for another example.







Fig. 2. Equilibrium bidding strategies
We notice that the maximum bid in the ﬁrst-price auction is common to
the bidders. In the example it is given by bw(1) = bs(2) = b = 2
3 (for details,
see the Appendix). To see why this must be the case, suppose bidding strate-
gies were increasing and that the maximum bids diﬀered. Then, one of the
bidders (the one with the higher maximum bid) would win with probability
1 for valuations above a certain threshold. But then, types of this bidder
with valuation above the threshold could safely lower their bids somewhat
and still win with probability 1.I naﬁrst-price auction this clearly increases
bidder payoﬀ, which contradicts that the putative strategy proﬁle could be
in equilibrium. Hence, maximum bids must coincide.
An alternative illustration of the mechanisms at work in this example can
be provided by looking at the probability of winning as a function of valuation
for the weak and strong bidder, respectively.16 Denote these probabilities by
qw(v) and qs(v), which we derive in the Appendix. Fig. 3 illustrates these for
both the ﬁrst-price and the second-price auction (qw(v) is heavy, and qs(v)
is thin, while unbroken lines capture the ﬁrst-price auction and broken lines
15The proof of this, however, is not as straightforward. See Maskin and Riley (2000).
16We refer the reader to Kirkegaard (2005), who draws on abstract results from the
mechanism design literature (notably, the implications of incentive compatibility for the
probabilities of winning) to back out results for ﬁrst-price auctions with asymmetric bid-
ders.





Fig. 3. Probability of winning
First, consider the ﬁrst-price auction. At low valuations the strong bidder
has a higher probability of winning compared to the weak bidder, while the
opposite is true at high valuations. Hence, while the weak bidder bids uni-
formly more aggressively, the fact that the distribution of the strong bidder
is “stretched” implies that this aggression is dominated by the strength of
the competition at “low” valuations. In contrast, in the second-price auction
bidders bid their values, and the strong bidder has a uniformly higher prob-
ability of winning, since he is facing weaker bidding competition. In other
words, the weak buyer is “favored” in the ﬁrst-price auction, while this is not
the case in the second-price auction.
2.1 Pre-auction oﬀers in ﬁrst-price auctions
Despite the remarks above, the ﬁrst-price auction is not ideal from the per-
spective of the auctioneer. The equilibrium in a ﬁrst-price auction involves
buyers following strictly increasing bidding strategies, ranging from zero (or
the reserve price) to a common maximal bid.T h a ti s ,t h es t r o n gb u y e rw i t h
valuation 2 would bid the same as the weak buyer with valuation 1. Clearly,
this implies that the weak buyer with valuation 1 wins more often than is
eﬃcient. Though this may appear to be beneﬁcial for the auctioneer, the fact
of the matter is that, while it is proﬁtable to favor the weak buyer, it can be
9overdone. In Fig. 1, for example, the weak buyer should never be favored to
such a degree that he outbids the strong buyer with a valuation above 1.5
(for which marginal revenue, or virtual valuation, of the strong buyer is 1).
To remedy this drawback, we propose a pre-auction oﬀer to the strong
buyer.17 The strong buyer is given the choice of buying the good outright at
the proposed price, or to reject, in which case a ﬁrst-price auction is held.
The oﬀer should be so high that it appeals to the strong buyer only if his
valuation is high (somewhere above 1.5). This allows “eﬃciency at the top”
— the strong buyer wins for sure if his valuation is very high — while favoring
the weak buyer when the strong buyer does not have a very high valuation.18
However, this mechanism has its weak spots as well. In particular, if
the strong buyer rejects the pre-auction oﬀer, the weak buyer infers that
the strong buyer is not so strong after all. Therefore, the incentive to bid
aggressively is diminished. While the weak buyer still bids more aggressively
than the strong buyer, the diﬀerence declines. The weak buyer wins less
often than without the pre-auction oﬀer. Since the weak buyer is not favored
as much, this raises the possibility that revenue decreases.
To examine the size of the two opposing forces on revenue by introducing
ap r e - a u c t i o no ﬀer, we assume in the following that valuations are drawn
from uniform distributions over the aforementioned ranges. While most of
the details are in the Appendix, we outline the analysis in the following.
For any given pre-auction oﬀer, p, it is easy to show that there is a unique
threshold equilibrium, in which the strong buyer accepts the pre-auction oﬀer
if, and only if, his valuation exceeds some valuation, z(p).19 Thus, rather than
deciding on a pre-auction oﬀer, p, we will consider the choice of a threshold
valuation, z,t ot a r g e t .T h eh i g h e rz is, the higher the pre-auction oﬀer is,
and the less likely it is that the oﬀer is accepted. Fig. 4 depicts the expected
revenue from any choice of z, z ∈ [1.5,2].I fz =2 ,t h eo ﬀer is never accepted,
and the mechanism is essentially the unmodiﬁed ﬁrst-price auction.
17As noted in the Introduction, for the type of (targeted) pre-auction oﬀer considered
i nt h i sp a p e rt om a k es e n s e ,w eh a v et ob ea b l et oi d e n t i f yap r i o r iwho in strong. Thus,
the pre-auction oﬀers considered in this paper are conceptually very diﬀerent from the
buy-out prices analysed in, e.g., Kirkegaard & Overgaard (2004). A buy-out price is more
like a pre-auction oﬀer made to all potential buyers in non-discriminatory fashion.
18Making a pre-auction oﬀer to the weak buyer makes little sense, since this would
i n t r o d u c ee v e nm o r es e v e r ei n e ﬃciencies at the top.
19If p is rejected, the weak buyer infers that the strong buyer’s valuation is below z.I n





Fig. 4. Proﬁt as a function of the threshold with z in [1.5,2]
Fig. 4 reveals that the auctioneer can beneﬁt from stipulating a pre-
auction oﬀer which is accepted with positive probability. The optimal thresh-
old, z∗,i sa p p r o x i m a t e l y1.885, which is induced by a pre-auction price of
p∗ ' 0.653, while the probability of acceptance by the strong bidder is ap-
proximately 0.058. If the pre-auction oﬀer is rejected, the common maximal
b i di nt h ea u c t i o ni sp∗ ' 0.653, and Fig. 5 illustrates the bidding strategies
(the dashed lines replicate the baseline case from Fig. 2 without a pre-auction
oﬀer to the strong bidder).
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Fig. 5. Bidding in ﬁrst-price auction with and without pre-auction oﬀer
11With a pre-auction oﬀe r ,w en o t et h a tt h ew e a kb u y e rb i d sless aggres-
sively in the auction after the strongest opponent types have been eliminated
by taking the oﬀer. This captures that, for the weak buyer, competition has
become weaker, and it is expected to take less to win. In contrast, the re-
maining, “low” types of the strong buyer bid more aggressively. To see this,
recall that in a ﬁrst-price format, where the winner pays his bid, any bidder
must weigh the decrease in payoﬀ from winning against the increased prob-
ability of winning when the bid is raised. But here the increased density of
opponent bids (due to the compression of the weak buyer’s bidding interval)
tilts this cost-beneﬁtt r a d e - o ﬀ in favor of higher bids. Hence, the remaining
types of the strong buyer bid more aggressively.
In addition to the fact that a pre-auction oﬀer improves revenue, it is
interesting to observe that the threshold should be strictly higher than 1.5,
the point at which the strong buyer’s marginal revenue (virtual valuation)
enters the range of the weak buyer’s marginal revenue from above. The
reason is that by reducing the asymmetry too much in the auction following
the oﬀer, the weak buyer is favored too little.
2.2 Pre-auction oﬀers in second-price auctions
Next, we show that pre-auction oﬀers in second-price auctions will always
decrease revenue. To illustrate, we start with another thought experiment.
The monopolist depicted in Fig. 1 is deciding whether to sell his entire
capacity to one particular market, rather than setting the same price in both
markets (uniform pricing) to clear his capacity. The former choice allows
some (extreme) discrimination between markets, whereas the latter is eﬃcient
and favors neither market. Despite this, it is easy to see that uniform pricing
dominates exclusive dealing. The reason is quite simply that by combining
the two markets into one (as under uniform pricing), willingness-to-pay for
a given capacity is higher than if one deals only with one market.20 For
example, in Fig. 1, if capacity is 0.8, the choices are to sell everything on
market 1 at a unit price of 0.2, to sell everything on market 2 at a unit
price of 0.4, or to sell at a capacity clearing price of 0.8 across both markets.
Uniform pricing is more proﬁtable, as it yields a higher unit price.21
20Notice that this argument does not rely on one market being stronger than the other.
21An alternative explanation might be useful. Assume the monopolist is initially selling
his capacity of 0.8 to market 2. By reverting to uniform pricing, and a price of 0.8, he
12Now, as suggested already, a second-price auction can be compared to
uniform pricing, since no one is favored, and the buyer with the highest valu-
ation wins (eﬃciency). Likewise, a pre-auction oﬀer in a second-price auction
is to some extent similar to exclusive dealing in a monopoly. If the buyer
targeted accepts the oﬀer, ineﬃciency may result because another buyer may
have a higher valuation. Eﬃciency can be restored only by abolishing the
pre-auction oﬀer and treating all buyers the same.22 As in the monopoly
case, the eﬃcient auction (without a pre-auction oﬀer) is more proﬁtable
than favoring one particular buyer. A formal proof of this can be found in
the Appendix. The result holds for any number of buyers, and does not
require that one buyer is stronger than others.23 Speciﬁcally, assume there
are n risk neutral buyers. Buyer i draws a valuation independently from the
distribution Fi on [0,vi], i =1 ,...,n. Fi has no mass points, and is strictly
increasing and continuously diﬀerentiable on (0,vi). Then we can state.
Proposition 1 A second-price auction preceded by a pre-auction oﬀer is
revenue-dominated by the straight second-price auction.
3C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we have considered auctions with asymmetric bidders. Then,
it is well known that standard auctions are neither revenue equivalent nor
necessarily eﬃcient. Therefore, we analyzed whether pre-auction oﬀers made
exclusively to particular bidders raise revenue, and we showed that this can
be the case when rejected oﬀers are followed by a ﬁrst-price auction, but never
when rejected oﬀers are followed by a second-price auction.24 Moreover, a
pre-auction oﬀer may increase eﬃciency in the ﬁrst price auction, whereas it
will lead to a loss in eﬃciency in the second price auction.
will sell only 0.6 on market 2, and the remaining 0.2 on market 1. The loss on market
2 is captured by the lost marginal revenue on 0.2 units. Since marginal revenue is below
demand, this must be below 0.8 on each unit moved from market 2 to market 1. On the
other hand, the gain is on average 0.8 for each of the units moved (since revenue on each
unit is 0.8). Hence, the gain exceeds the loss.
22In contrast, abolishing pre-auction oﬀers in ﬁrst-price auctions does not restore eﬃ-
ciency.
23Also, the result remains valid in the presence of a reserve price (at least one below
the pre-auction oﬀer). Hence, we are not constrained to looking at “must sell” auctions.
24In contrast, under standard regularity and with symmetric buyers, Bulow & Klem-
perer (1996) show that pre-auction oﬀers decrease revenue, regardless of the format.
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14Appendix
First-price auctions. Assume the weak buyer’s valuation is drawn from the
uniform distribution over [0,1], while the strong buyer’s valuation is drawn
from the uniform distribution over [0,z], z ≥ 1. Then, we know from the






















z2 v2 − 1
!
,v∈ [0,z)
where w denotes the weak buyer, and s the strong buyer.
For example, when z =2 ,w eg e tbw(v)= 2
3v(2 −
√




4+3 v2 − 2). These bidding functions are depicted in Fig. 2. Given
these, the weak buyer with valuation v outbids the strong buyer if the strong
buyer has a valuation below e v,w h e r ee v solves bw(v)=bs(e v). This event has
probability qw(v)= v √
4−3v2. Similarly, a strong bidder with valuation v wins
with probability qs(v)= 2v √
4+3v2. These winning probabilities are graphed in
Fig. 3, alongside the winning probabilities for the buyers in a second-price
auction.25

















Then, the probability that the winning bid is below b, Fz(b),i st h ep r o b -
ability that both buyers have valuations below the valuation for which a bid


























25In a second-price auction, a buyer wins whenever the rival has a lower valuation than
himself.
15where γ = 1
(1− 1
z2)
2. Letting fz(b) be the density of the winning bid, expected








which can be computed, given (A2).
We now turn to the ﬁrst-price auction with a pre-auction oﬀer. Again,
letting p denote the pre-auction oﬀer, we claim the strong buyer accepts
p if, and only if, his valuation exceeds z,w h e r ez (uniquely) solves p =
z
1+z. We start by assuming the proposed strategies form an equilibrium, and
conﬁrm this by showing that there is no incentive to deviate. First, if the
auction stage is reached, the beliefs, given the strategy in the ﬁrst stage, is
that buyers’ valuations are drawn from uniform distributions over [0,1] and
[0,z], respectively. Given this, the equilibrium bidding strategies are outlined
above. If the strong buyer deviates in the ﬁrst stage, rejecting p when his
valuation was above z, it is easy to show that his best response in the ﬁrst
price auction is to submit the highest bid, z
1+z.26 Thus, regardless of whether
he accepts or rejects, he will win with probability one, and he will pay z
1+z.
Hence, there is no incentive to deviate. Neither is there an incentive for the
strong buyer with a valuation below z to accept p. The reason is that he can
just submit a bid of z
1+z in the second stage and win with probability one,
so he will be no worse oﬀ rejecting.
In the mechanism with a pre-auction oﬀer, the good may be sold in the
ﬁrst stage, at the price stipulated by the auctioneer, z
1+z, or it may be sold in
the second stage, where bidding strategies have already been outlined, given
general beliefs on z.S p e c i ﬁcally, the object is sold in the ﬁrst round with
probability 2−z
2 , i.e. the probability that the strong buyer has a valuation
in excess of z. With probability z
2, the strong buyer rejects the oﬀer, in
which case the weak buyer updates his beliefs, and the expected revenue will
therefore be (A3). Hence, expected revenue in the new mechanism is, as a
function of z,
26To see this, notice that the strong buyer with valuation v tries to maximize (v−b)qs(b),
where qs(b) is the probability that the weak buyer bids below b.A ta n yb where the ﬁrst




























(b2 + γ1/2)(b − γ1/4)(b + γ1/4)
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This function is graphed in Fig. 4.
Second-price auctions. Assume there are n risk neutral buyers. Buyer i
draws a valuation independently from the distribution function Fi on [0,vi],
i =1 ,...,n. Fi has no mass points, is strictly increasing and continuously
diﬀerentiable on (0,vi),w i t hfi denoting the density. If v>vi, Fi(v)=1
and fi(v)=0 . Without loss of generality, the buyers are ordered such that
vn ≥ vn−1 ≥ ... ≥ v1.
We consider the possibility that the seller makes a pre-auction oﬀer to
some buyer, buyer i,s a y .B u y e ri accepts if his valuation is at least b v.N o t i c e
that if i = n and b v ≥ vn−1 with vn > vn−1, the pre-auction oﬀer does not
change the allocation, as buyer n would win regardless, when his valuation
exceeds vn−1.B yt h eRevenue Equivalence Theorem, revenue is unaﬀected.
Hence, we consider thresholds below vn−1 in the following.
Let A be the set of buyers other than buyer i who are aﬀected by the
pre-auction oﬀer. If j ∈ A,t h e nvj ≥ b v, meaning that there is a chance buyer
j has the highest valuation, yet loses to buyer i.L e tB be the set of buyers




Fk(v), be the probability that buyer j with valu-
ation v has the highest valuation.
17In the following, we will use Myerson’s (1981) method of writing ex-
pected revenue. Let Jj(v)=v −
1−Fi(v)
fi(v) ,d e n o t eb u y e rj’s virtual valuation,
the counterpart to marginal revenue in monopoly, when his valuation is v.
In monopoly, revenue is the area under marginal revenue, which in auctions
m e a n st h a te x p e c t e dr e v e n u ef r o mb u y e rj can be calculated as the expecta-
tion of Jj(v), taking into account the probability that buyer j with valuation
v wins the auction.
























since buyer j with a valuation below b v wins if he has the highest valuation,
which occurs with probability Gj(v),b u y e ri,t ow h o mt h eo ﬀer is made,
wins with probability one if his valuation is above b v,a n db u y e rj 6= i with
valuation above b v wins if he has the highest valuation and buyer i has a
valuation below b v.








R e v e n u ef r o mt h et w oa u c t i o n sc a nn o wb ec o m p a r e d ,




















The ﬁrst term is identical to expected revenue in a second-price auction
with reserve price of b v (which buyers in B never win). The second term is
revenue in a mechanism where buyer i is oﬀered the good at a price of b v,
and if he rejects, all other buyers are invited to a second-price auction with
18a reserve price of b v. Clearly, the former auction is more proﬁtable, implying
that Di(b v) > 0 as we wanted to prove.











Fk(v)fj(v)dv − Ji(b v)(1 − Gi(b v))
#
.
The ﬁrst term in brackets is equivalent to the expected revenue in a second-
price auction with a reserve price of b v among all the buyers except buyer
i. This clearly exceeds revenue from posting a price of b v, which would yield
expected revenue of b v(1 − Gi(b v)). Hence,
ERi
0(b v) ≥ fi(b v)(1 − Gi(b v))(b v − Ji(b v)) = (1 − Gi(b v))(1 − Fi(b v)) ≥ 0.
It follows that a pre-auction oﬀer never improves revenue in a second-price
auction.27 Notice that we have not assumed that Jj is monotonic, as is
often the case in auction theory. Bulow and Klemperer (1996) argued that
pre-auction oﬀe r sa r en o tp r o ﬁtable in a model with symmetric buyers and
monotonic virtual valuations. Hence, we generalize this result in several
directions.
T or e v e a lt h ei n t u i t i o nb e h i n dt h er e s u l tw er e a r r a n g et h ed e r i v a t i v e ,
ERi











(1 − Gi(b v))
dv − Ji(b v)
#
.
If the pre-auction oﬀer changes the allocation, it is because buyer i wins
when another buyer (in A) has a higher valuation. In this event, the gain
contributing to an increase in revenue is the virtual valuation of buyer i,
Ji(b v) ≤ b v. The loss, however, is the virtual valuation of a buyer known to
have a higher valuation. This is at least equal to b v. On a market where
the lowest willingness-to-pay is b v a monopolist can get at least b v for each of
his units (and strictly more if he faces a capacity constraint), so the average
marginal revenue, or virtual valuation, is at least b v. Hence, the loss from
introducing a pre-auction oﬀer exceeds the gain.
27Clearly, for any i, A and B depend on b v.G i v e nA and B, however, revenue increases
by increasing b v until buyers move from A to B (b v =m i n j∈A vj). As we reduce A further,
revenue increases. For any given i, it follows that the optimal b v = vi, which is equivalent
to no pre-auction oﬀer.
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